§ 1705 Unconstitutional Due to Vagueness and as an Improper Delegation of Congressional Authority (the “motion to dismiss”), in United States v. In a Final Report & Recommendation on Defendant’s Motion to Declare 18 U.S.C. Recently, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reminded us of the ease with which a “relatively sophisticated individual deliberately engaged in international commerce” can understand the IEEPA statute. Indeed, many courts have found sanctions not to be vague, particularly because IEEPA “governs the activities of relatively sophisticated individuals who are deliberately engaged in international commerce and, therefore, must be familiar with (if not expert in) various legal regimes-e.g., customs duties and tariffs-multiple countries.” U.S. However, the courts don’t feel the same way. For those of us who work on sanctions issues every day, we find it–and the regulations issued pursuant to its authority–to be complex, confusing, and like many defendants charged with violations of U.S. seeks to impose economic sanctions on a target–be it a country, person, company, or organization. This is a post about another such failed motion.įor those of you unfamiliar with IEEPA, it is the principal statute invoked by the President when the U.S. From what I understand, all of those motions have failed. Finally, a large number of those motions have included argument that IEEPA is unconstitutionally vague.

persons–i.e., foreign nationals–who engaged in the prohibited conduct for which they were charged outside of the U.S. A number of those motions have been filed by defendants who were non-U.S. There have been a number of motions to dismiss filed by defendants in criminal prosecutions for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) arising from conduct prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), and its predecessor the Iranian Transactions Regulations.

Ofac iran sanctions ieepa